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Abstract
This paper describes new conditions on parameters selection that lead to an efficient algo-
rithm for forging ElGamal digital signature. Our work is inspired by Bleichenbacher’s ideas.
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1 Introduction
Numerous digital signature algorithms have been developed since the invention of the
public key cryptography in the late 1970s[3,15,14]. They almost all have the same princi-
ple. Every user possesses two kinds of keys. The first one is private, must be kept secret
and stored only locally. The second is public and must be largely diffused to be accessible
to the others users. To sign a particular message, a contract or a will M , Alice has to
solve a hard mathematical equation depending of M and of her public key. With the help
of her private key, she is able to furnish the solutions. Bob, the judge or anybody, can
verify that the solutions computed by Alice are valid. For an adversary, without knowing
Alice private key, the algorithm is constructed in such a way that it is computationally
too hard to solve the considered equation.
One of the most popular signature algorithm was proposed by ElGamal[4]. It has many
variants[16,17,9,5] and is based on the hard discrete logarithm problem. Since its con-
ception in 1985, several attacks were mounted and have revealed possible weaknesses if
the signature keys were not carefully selected[2,1,10,13]. However, no general method for
breaking totally the system is known.
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In an ElGamal signature protocol, a signer, in addition to his private key, must detain
three other integer parameters (p, α, y) as a public key. In 1996, Bleichenbacher[2] pre-
sented a cryptanalysis where he showed that if the generator α and the modulus p verify
some special relations, it is possible to forge ElGamal signature for any arbitrary message.
In particular, he proved that, the signature scheme becomes insecure when parameters α
and p are chosen such that α divides p− 1. Hence, selecting α = 2 is imprudent.
The purpose of our work, is to describe new conditions on parameters selection that lead
to an efficient algorithm for forging ElGamal signature for any arbitrary message. As an
extension of Bleichenbacher’s result, we show that, if the modular inverse of the generator
α divides p − 1, then it is possible to break the system. As an example, the choice of
α =
p + 1
2
as a generator, is not recommended.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries which will be utilized
in the sequel. Our contribution, mainly composed by Algorithm 2 and Corollary 3, is
presented in section 3. We conclude in section 4.
Throughout this article, we will adopt ElGamal paper notations[4]. Z, N are respectively
the sets of integers and non-negative integers. For every positive integer n, we denote by
Zn the finite ring of modular integers and by Z
∗
n the multiplicative group of its invertible
elements. Let a, b, c be three integers. The great common divisor of a and b is denoted
by gcd(a, b). We write a ≡ b [c] if c divides the difference a − b, and a = b mod c if a is
the remainder in the division of b by c. The positive integer a is said to be B-smooth[8,
p.92], B ∈ N, if every prime factor of a is less than or equal to the bound B.
We start, in the next section, by preliminaries containing known mathematical facts that
will be exploited later.
2 Preliminaries
Before exploring new situations under which one can forge ElGamal digital signature, we
briefly review three questions that are directly related to our result.
2.1 Discrete logarithm problem when p− 1 is B-smooth
The discrete logarithm problem importance started to grow with the publication in 1976
of the fundamental work of Diffie and Hellman[3,11]. The issue became central in public
key cryptography.
Let p be a prime integer and α a primitive root of Z∗n. We consider the discrete logarithm
equation
αx ≡ y [p] (1)
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where y is fixed in {1, 2, 3, . . . , p− 1}, and x is unknown in {0, 1, 2, . . . , p− 2}.
In 1978, Pohlig and Hellman[12] published a practical method to solve equation (1) when
all the prime factors of p−1 are not too large. Let us recall the outlines of their algorithm.
Assume that p − 1 is B-smooth. The bound B depends on the computers power. This
implies that we can obtain the prime factorization of p− 1 : p− 1 = pn11 pn22 . . . pnkk where
ni, ki ∈ N∗ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We will first find x modulo pnii for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and
apply the Chinese Remainder Theorem[8, p.68] to compute x modulo pn11 p
n2
2 . . . p
nk
k .
The p1-ary representation of x1 = x mod p
n1
1 can be written as :
x1 = b0 + b1 p1 + . . .+ bn1−1 p
n1−1
1 (2)
where b0, b1, . . . , bn1−1 are unknown in {0, 1, . . . p1 − 1}.
Let λ1 = p
n1−1
1 p
n2
2 . . . p
nk
k . We have λ1 x1 = λ1 b0 +K1 (p− 1), K1 ∈ N. Since αK1 (p−1) ≡
1 [p], equation (1) can be transformed to αλ1 x1 ≡ yλ1 [p] and therefore
αλ1 b0 ≡ yλ1 [p] (3)
From equation (3) we obtain the first coefficient b0.
Similarly, if λ2 = p
n1−2
1 p
n2
2 . . . p
nk
k , then λ2 x1 = λ2 b0 + λ2 b1 p1 +K2 (p− 1), K2 ∈ N. As
αK2 (p−1) ≡ 1 [p], equation (1) becomes αλ2 x1 ≡ yλ2 [p] and therefore
αλ2 b0+λ2 b1 p1 ≡ yλ2 [p] (4)
We get the second coefficient b1 from equation (4).
Gradually, we compute b0, b1, b2, . . . , bn1−1 and then determine x1. This is computation-
ally possible since 2n1 ≤ p− 1 and then n1 ≤ ln(p− 1)
ln 2
. In other word, n1 is bounded by
the bit length of p− 1.
We repeat the technique with p2, p3, . . . , pk and arrive to the following system of congru-
ences :


x ≡ x1 [pn11 ]
x ≡ x2 [pn22 ]
...
...
x ≡ xk [pnkk ]
(5)
Natural index k is not too large since k ≤
k∑
i=1
ni ≤ ln(p− 1)
ln 2
. Hence, system (5) can
efficiently be solved by the Chinese Remainder Theorem method whose running time is
O(ln2 p) bit operations. The complexity of Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is O(
∑k
i=1 ni(ln p+√
pi)) bit operations[12, 9, p.108].
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2.2 ElGamal signature algorithm
We recall the basic ElGamal protocol[4,19,8] in three steps.
1. Alice begins by choosing three numbers p, α and x such that :
- p is a large prime integer.
- α is a primitive root of the finite multiplicative group Z∗p.
- x is a random element taken in {1, 2, . . . , p− 2}.
She computes y = αx mod p and publishes the triplet (p, α, y) as her public key. She
keeps secret the parameter x as her private key.
2. Suppose that Alice desires to sign the message m < p. She must solve the modular
equation
αm ≡ yr rs [p] (6)
where r and s are two unknown variables.
Alice computes r = αk mod p, where k is selected randomly and is invertible modulo p−1.
She has exactly ϕ(p− 1) possibilities for k, where ϕ is the phi-Euler function. Equation
(6) is then equivalent to :
m ≡ x r + k s [p− 1] (7)
As Alice possesses the secret key x, and as the integer k is invertible modulo p − 1, she
computes the second unknown variable s from relation (7) by :
s ≡ m− x r
k
[p− 1] (8)
The inverse modulo p − 1 of the integer k in equation (8) is computed by the extended
Euclidean algorithm whose complexity is O(ln2 p) bit operations.
3. Bob can verify the signature by checking that congruence (6) is valid.
Observe that, in step 1., we need to know how to construct signature keys. Generally,
the running time for generating prime integers takes the most important part in the total
running time. In [6], we made experimental tests and concluded by suggesting some rapid
procedures. In step 2., the random integer k must be kept secret, otherwise relation (7)
allows any adversary to obtain Alice private key x. The fact of having many possibilities
for the valid pairs (r, s) does not affect the system security. Indeed, these pairs are
uniformly distributed[18].
To prevent obvious attacks against ElGamal signature scheme, some of theme mentioned
in the original paper[4], it is necessary to work with a free collision hash function h. The
message M is simply replaced by m = h(M) before applying the signature algorithm. We
can take h equal to the secure hash algorithm SHA1[19. p139, 8. chap9].
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2.3 Bleichenbacher’s attack
In Eurocrypt’96 meeting, Bleichenbacher indicated a possible weakness in the ElGamal
signature scheme if the keys are not properly chosen[2,1]. His ideas are summarized in
his main theorem.
Theorem 1.[2] Let p− 1 = bw where b is B-smooth and let yA ≡ αxA [p] be the public
key of user A. If a generator β = c w with 0 < c < b and an integer t are known such
that βt ≡ α [p] then a valid signature (r, s) on a given h can be found.
This theorem has the immediate consequence :
Corollary 1.[2] If α is B-smooth and divides p−1, then it is possible to generate a valid
ElGamal signature on an arbitrary value h.
Now, we can move to the next section where we expose our contribution.
3 Our contribution
In this section, we present our main result. The first sufficient condition for forging
ElGamal signature is based on a slight simplification of Bleichenbacher’s theorem. More
precisely, we have :
Theorem 2. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature scheme. If an
adversary can compute a nonnegative integer k ≤ p−2, relatively prime to p−1 and such
that
p− 1
gcd(p− 1, αk mod p) is B-smooth, then he will be able to forge Alice signature.
Proof. We follow the method used in [2]. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal
signature protocol. If we put D = gcd(p − 1, αk mod p), then there exist two coprimes
p1 and a1 such that p − 1 = Dp1 and αk mod p = Da1. Let H be the subgroup of Z∗p
generated by the particular element αDmod p. Since y ≡ αx [p], where the natural integer
x is Alice secret key, we have yD ≡ (αD)x [p] and then yDmod p ∈ H . By hypothesis, the
order of the subgroup H ,
p− 1
D
= p1 is B-smooth, so the discrete logarithm equation
(αD)X ≡ yD [p] (9)
can be solved in polynomial time. Hence there exists x0 ∈ N such that (αD)x0 ≡ yD [p].
To forge Alice signature for a message M , and a hash function h, if the adversary puts
m = h(M), he must find two positive integers r, s such that αm ≡ yr rs [p]. If he chooses
r = αkmod p, he will have the equivalences :
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αm ≡ yr rs [p]⇐⇒ αm ≡ yDa1 αk s [p]⇐⇒ αm ≡ [(αD)x0 ]a1 αk s [p]⇐⇒ αm ≡ αx0 r αk s [p]
⇐⇒ m ≡ x0 r + k s [p− 1] ⇐⇒ s ≡ m− x0 r
k
[p− 1].
So (r, s) is a valid signature for the message M , obtained without knowing Alice secret
key.
If the first valid exponent k in our Theorem 2 is not too large, the adversary can construct
the following deterministic algorithm in order to forge ElGamal signature. Consequently,
we recommend that when selecting the signature keys, we have to verify that for any
k ≤ K0, where gcd(k, p− 1) = 1 and K0 is the largest bound allowed by computer power,
the integer
p− 1
gcd(p− 1, αk mod p) has at least one large prime factor.
Algorithm 1
Input : Alice public key (p, α, y) and the message M to be signed.
Output : The signature (r, s) of M .
1. Read(p, α, y); {(p, α, y) is Alice public key}.
2. Read(M); m:=h(M); {m is the hashed of the message to be signed}.
3. j ← −1; {Initialization of integers j which play the role of exponents k}.
4. F ← 0; {F is a flag}.
5. While (F=0) do
5.1. j ← j + 2; {j must be invertible modulo p− 1, so j is odd}.
5.2. If gcd(p− 1, j) = 1 then
5.2.1. r ← αj mod p; { r will be the first parameter of the signature}.
5.2.2. D ← gcd(p−1, r); { D will be the exponent in equation (9)}.
5.2.3. If (p− 1)/D is B-smooth, then
5.2.3.1 k ← j; { k is the searched exponent of α}.
5.2.3.2 F ← 1; { To stop the while loop}.
6. x0 ← X ; {X is a solution of equation (9), obtained by Pohlig-Hellman algorithm[12]}.
7. s← m− x0 r
k
mod (p− 1); {s is the second parameter of the signature}.
8. Return(r, s); {(r, s) is the digital signature}.
Our theorem 2 has a first remarkable consequence : if Q denotes the part of the prime
factorization of p− 1 that is not B-smooth and if αk mod p, for some k ∈ N, is a multiple
of Q then ElGamal signature scheme is insecure. More formally :
Corollary 2. Let pn11 p
n2
2 . . . p
nk
k q
n′
1
1 q
n′
2
2 . . . q
n′
l
l be the classical prime factorization of p−1,
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where pα11 p
α2
2 . . . p
αr
r is B-smooth. If an adversary can compute a natural integer k, k ≤
p−2, relatively prime to p−1 and such that αk mod p is a multiple of Q = qn′11 qn
′
2
2 . . . q
n′
l
l ,
then he will be able to forge Alice signature for any arbitrary message M .
Proof. Observe, first, that α is not necessary a divisor of p− 1, nor a B-smooth integer.
Since αk mod p is a multiple of Q, we have Q divides gcd(p−1, αk mod p). So pn11 pn22 . . . pnkk
is a multiple of
p− 1
gcd(p− 1, αk mod p), and then
p− 1
gcd(p− 1, αk mod p) is B-smooth. We
conclude by applying Theorem 2.
If the first valid exponent k is not too large, Corollary 2 leads to a more practical algorithm
for forging ElGamal signature.
Algorithm 2
Input : Alice public key (p, α, y) and the message M to be signed.
Output : The signature (r, s) of M .
1. Read(p, α, y); {(p, α, y) is Alice public key}.
2. Read(M); m:=h(M); {m is the hashed of the message to be signed}.
3. Q0 ← Q; {Q is the part of p− 1 that is not B-smoot}.
4. j ← −1; {Initialization of integers j which play the role of exponents k}.
5. F ← 0; {F is a flag}.
6. While (F=0) do
6.1. j ← j + 2; {j must be invertible modulo p− 1, so j is odd}.
6.2. If gcd(p− 1, j) = 1; then
6.2.1. r ← αj mod p; { r will be the first parameter of the signature}.
6.2.2. If r mod Q0 = 0 then
6.2.2.1. k ← j; { k is the searched exponent of α}.
6.2.2.2. F ← 1; { To stop the while loop}.
7. D ← gcd(p− 1, r); { D will be the exponent in equation (9)}.
8. x0 ← X ; {X is a solution of equation (9), obtained by Pohlig-Hellman algorithm[12]}.
9. s← m− x0 r
k
mod (p− 1); {s is the second parameter of the signature}.
10. Return(r, s); {(r, s) is the digital signature}.
Next result, which can be seen as an extension of Blechenbacher’s Corollary 1, shows that
in an ElGamal signature scheme, it is not secure to have a primitive root whose modular
inverse divides p − 1. In particular, as a primitive root, α = p+ 1
2
is not recommended
since its inverse is 2. More explicitly :
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Corollary 3. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature protocol. An
adversary can forge Alice signature for any given message if one of the following conditions
is satisfied :
a) p ≡ 1 [4], α is B-smooth and divides p− 1.
b) p ≡ 1 [4], 1
α
mod p is B-smooth and divides p− 1.
c) α2 is B-smooth and divides p− 1.
Proof. a) Put p − 1 = αQ. As α is a primitive root, we have α(p−1)/2 ≡ −1 [p], and
so αk ≡ Q [p] where k = (p − 3)/2. Consequently gcd(p − 1, αk mod p) = Q and then
p− 1
gcd(p− 1, αk mod p) = α which is smooth and this allows the use of our theorem 2.
b) It is easy to see that α is a primitive root modulo p if and only if
1
α
mod p is a
primitive root. Suppose that
1
α
mod p is B-smooth and divides p − 1. If the public key
was (p,
1
α
mod p,
1
y
mod p), and the private key was the same parameter x, an adversary
would be able to forge the signature and to find two valid integers (r1, s1) for any arbitrary
message M . With (r, s) = (r1,−s1 mod p − 1), the adversary forges Alice signature for
the message M . Indeed, ElGamal equation (1) is equivalent to
(
1
α
)m ≡ (1
y
)r1 (r1)
−s1 [p] (10)
c) If p ≡ 1 [4], then the affirmation is true from case a). Assume then that p ≡ 3 [4] and
put p = 3 + 4K, K ∈ N∗. As α is a primitive root, we have α(p−1)/2 ≡ −1 [p], and then
α2 (α(p−5)/2 mod p) = p−1. Let k = (p−5)/2. Since k = 2K−1, gcd(p−1, k) divides 4 and
as k is odd, gcd(p−1, k) = 1. On the other hand p− 1
gcd(p− 1, αk mod p) =
p− 1
αk mod p
= α2
is B-smooth which allows us to apply theorem 2 and achieve the proof.
Before concluding, we give the following theoretical theorem relative to the number of
exponents k figuring in Corollary 2 and Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3. Let α be a primitive root of the multiplicative group Z∗p. For any fixed
integer Q such that 1 ≤ Q ≤ p− 1, if we set
Eα = {k ∈ N / 1 ≤ k ≤ p− 2, gcd(p− 1, k) = 1, and Q divides αk mod p} (11)
then the cardinality of Eα is independent of the choice of the primitive root α.
Proof. Let α, β be two fixed primitive roots of Z∗p. It is well-known that there exists
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p − 2} such that gcd(p − 1, i) = 1 and α ≡ βi [p]. Consider then the
function :
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f : Eα −→ Eβ
k 7→ ik mod (p− 1)
First we have f(k) ∈ Eβ , where Eβ is defined like Eα in relation (13). Indeed gcd(p −
1, ik mod (p− 1)) = gcd(p− 1, ik) = 1 since gcd(p− 1, k) = gcd(p− 1, i) = 1.
On the other hand βik mod (p−1) ≡ βik ≡ αk [p], so Q divides βik mod (p−1) mod p and
therefore ik mod (p− 1) ∈ Eβ .
Let us now establish that f is an injective function. We have successively :
f(k) = f(k′) =⇒ ik mod (p− 1) = ik′ mod (p− 1) =⇒ i k ≡ ik′ [p− 1] =⇒ k ≡ k′ [p− 1]
since i is invertible modulo p− 1. As 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ p− 2, we obtain that k = k′.
Since f is injective Card(Eα) ≤ Card(Eβ) and by interchanging the role of the parameters
α and β, we find that Card(Eβ) ≤ Card(Eα) and so Card(Eα) = Card(Eβ). This means
that Card(Eα) is a constant depending only of the two integers p and Q.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we described new conditions on parameters selection that can lead to an
efficient deterministic algorithm for forging ElGamal digital signature. Our approach is
based on the work of Bleichenbacher presented at Eurocrypt’96 conference[2].
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